NATIONAL CONFLICT IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD: GREEKS AND MACEDONIANS AT THE CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

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by Loring M. Danforth 

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1. Introduction

    In the present era of globalization ethnic nationalism can no longer be understood simply as a relationship between an ethnic minority and the dominant nation of the state in which it lives. With the deterritorialization of national communities brought about by large-scale population movements and recent developments in the fields of communications and transportation, diaspora communities have become deeply involved in the political affairs of their homelands. As a result transnational national communities are being constructed, which together with international organizations like the United Nations and the European Community, are becoming increasingly important participants in nationalist struggles throughout the world. Nation-states are being challenged simultaneously from above and below -- from without and within -- by international organizations on the one hand and by ethnic minorities on the other. National conilicts are being fought, in other words, on a transnational level.
    In this essay I explore this paradox by examining the way the issue of the human rights of the Macedonian minority of northern Greece was dealt with at the 1990 meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). There a transnational Macedonian delegation made up of representatives from the Republic of Macedonia (which was then one of the states of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), from Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, and from Macedonian diaspora communities abroad was able to shift the balance of power in its favor and away from the Greek nation-state by appealing to the universalist and pluralist definitions of national identity and human rights that prevail in the context of international organizations like the CSCE.[1]
 

2. The Macedonian Question in Balkan History

    The Macedonian Question has been a source of conflict in the Balkans for over a hundred years. During the Ottoman period, which lasted from the fourteenth century until 1913, the population of the geographical area known as Macedonia included an amazing number of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, including Slavic- and Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians, Turkish- and Albanian-speaking Moslems, Romanian-speaking Vlachs, Jews, and Gypsies. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the population of Macedonia was increasingly being defined from various external nationalist perspectives in terms of national categories such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, and Turks. Ottoman authorities, however, continued to divide the population of the empire into administrative units, or millets on the basis of religious identity rather than language, ethnicity, or nationality. The hegemony which the Greeks exercised over the Orthodox Christian millet was seriously challenged for the first time by the establishment of an independent Bulgarian Church in 1870. Orthodox communities in "Macedonia" now had the choice of affiliating with either the Greek or the Bulgarian national church. This marked an intensification of the "Macedonian Struggle" in which Greek, Bulgarian, and to a lesser extent Serbian, claims came into conflict over who would gain control over the people and the territory of Macedonia.
    By the 1890s the three Balkan states were each fielding irregular bands of guerrilla fighters who attacked the Turks, fought each other, and terrorized the local population. In addition, through the construction of churches and schools and the assignment of priests and teachers, each state was conducting an intense propaganda campaign, whose goal was to instill the preferred, or "proper," sense of national identity among the Orthodox Christians of Macedonia.[2] The Macedonian Struggle reached its climax in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which ended with the partitioning of Macedonia among Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia (later a dominant part of Yugoslavia).
    Since 1913 the fates of the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, Greek (Aegean) Macedonia, and Yugoslav (Vardar) Macedonia have varied considerably. With the exception of a brief period following World War II, the Bulgarian government has officially denied the existence of a Macedonian nation, arguing instead that all the Slavs of Macedonia are Bulgarians. Since 1948, however, its policy toward the Macedonians in Bulgaria has been one of forced assimilation into mainstream Bulgarian society.
    The Greek government has also consistently denied the existence of both a Macedonian nation and a Macedonian minority in northern Greece and has adopted a policy of assimilation toward the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Greek Macedonia. After 1913 all Slavic personal and place names were Hellenized, and all evidence of the existence of Slavic literacy was destroyed. As a result of the population exchanges which took place between Greece and Bulgaria, as well as Greece and Turkey in the 1920s, the number of people in Greek Macedonia who had a sense of Greek national identity increased substantially.
Under the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936-40, repression of the Slavic speakers, who by this time had increasingly begun to identify themselves as Macedonians, was particularly severe: people who spoke Macedonian were beaten, fined, and imprisoned. After the Greek Civil War (1946-49), in which many Macedonians supported the unsuccessful Communist cause, some 35,000 Macedonians fled to Yugoslavia and other countries in eastern Europe under extremely difficult circumstances (Kofos 1964:186). In the decades that followed, conservative Greek governments continued this policy of coercion and assimilation, perhaps the most egregious examples of which were the "language oaths" administered in several Macedonian villages, which required Macedonians to swear that they would renounce their "Slavic dialect" and from then on speak only Greek (Pribichevich 1982:246).
    Until World War II the official Serbian (and Yugoslav) position was that the Slavs of Macedonia did not constitute a distinct ethnic or national group, but that they were all "South Serbs." On August 2, 1944, however, Tito and the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia established the People's Republic of Macedonia with its capital of Skopje as one of the states of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At this time the existence of a Macedonian nation was officially recognized and a variety of state institutions were established which played an important role in the construction of a Macedonian national community. The Macedonian case was part of Tito's more general attempt to create a pluralist and multinational Yugoslav state. By 1950 a standard literary Macedonian language had been developed, and in 1967 an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church was established. In this way Macedonians achieved a significant degree of cultural autonomy, even if they failed to achieve complete national independence.
    With the death of Tito in 1980, the constraints which the central Yugoslav government had placed on the expression of Macedonian nationalism were gradually loosened. As Yugoslavia began to collapse in the early 1990s, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, in a referendum held on September 8, 1991, voted overwhelmingly in favor of initiating the process of establishing a completely sovereign and independent Macedonian state.
    The fledgling state of Macedonia, however, faced a difficult struggle for international recognition because of the fierce opposition mounted by Greece to what Greeks claim to be the misappropriation by a Slavic people of the name Macedonia, a name that "was, is, and always will be Greek." At the insistence of Greece, therefore, in December, 1991, the European Community stated that it would not recognize the Republic of Macedonia until it guaranteed that it had no territorial claims against any neighboring state and that it would not engage in hostile acts against any such state, including the use of a name which im lied territorial claims. In an attempt to convince the European Community of its peaceful intentions, the Macedonian parliament in January, 1992, adopted two amendments to the Macedonian constitution, which had been in effect for less than a year. Amendment 1 stated that the Republic had no territorial claims against any neighboring state and that the borders of the Republic could be changed only in accordance with "generally accepted international norms," while Amendment 2 stated that the Republic would not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In addition, the first President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, offered to sign a bilateral agreement with Greece affirming the permanence of the international border between the two countries. Shortly thereafter an EC Arbitration Commission found that Macedonia fulfilled all conditions for recognition. In addition, it specifically stated that the use of the name "Macedonia" did not imply territorial claims toward a neighboring state. In spite of this, however, in January, 1992, at the insistence of Greece, the European Community refused to recognize the Republic of Macedonia.
    During this period an incredible variety of alternative names were proposed for Macedonia. Officially the Greek government refused to accept any name for the Republic which included the word "Macedonia" in any form whether "as a noun or as an adjectival modifier." Proposed solutions to the dilemma ranged from names like Dardania and Paeonia (used in antiquity to designate regions to the north of ancient Macedonia), to names like South Slavia, the Vardar Republic, the Central Balkan Republic, and the Republic of Skopje, all of which were acceptable to Greece. Other compromise solutions, which were not acceptable to Greece, included Northern Macedonia, New Macedonia, and the Slavic Republic of Macedonia. At one point Greece even suggested that the Republic adopt two names, one official name for external use (which could not include the word "Macedonia") and one unofficial name for internal consumption (which could include the word "Macedonia"). All these solutions, however, were rejected by the Republic itself, which insisted that it would only accept recognition under its constitutional name: the Republic of Macedonia.
    In December, 1992, the dispute shifted from the capitals of the member states of the European Community to New York City, when the Republic of Macedonia applied for admission to the United Nations. The governments of both Greece and Macedonia were ready to compromise when a plan was proposed according to which the Republic would be admitted to the United Nations under the temporary or provisional name "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," with a permanent name to be chosen later through a process of mediation. In April, 1993, the Security Council voted unanimously to admit "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as a member of the United Nations. The Republic, however, was not allowed to fly its flag, the sixteen-ray sun or star of Vergina at the United Nations headquarters because according to Greece this was the emblem of the ancient Macedonians (who were Greek) and is therefore a Greek national symbol.
    Finally, in December, 1993, just before Greece was to assume the rotating presidency of the European Community, six members of the European Community -Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands - decided to recognize the Republic of Macedonia under the name "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and establish full diplomatic relations with it. Admission to the UN and recognition by the major democracies of Western Europe will, one would hope, bring an end to the economic chaos and political instability which has characterized the two years of limbo during which the Republic of Macedonia has struggled unsuccessfully for international acceptance and recognition.[3]

3. Competing Claims to Macedonian Identity

    According to the Greek nationalist position on the Macedonian Question, because Alexander the
Great and the ancient Macedonians were Greeks, ancient and modern Greece are bound in an unbroken line of racial and cultural continuity.[4] It is only Greeks, therefore, who have the right to identify themselves as Macedonians, not the Slavs of southern Yugoslavia, who settled in Macedonia in the sixth century AD and who called themselves "Bulgarians" until 1944. Greeks, therefore, generally refer to Macedonians as "Skopians," a practice comparable to calling Greeks "Athenians."
  The negation of Macedonian identity in Greek nationalist ideology focuses on three main points: the existence of a Macedonian nation, a Macedonian language, and a Macedonian minority in Greece. From the Greek nationalist perspective there cannot be a Macedonian nation since there has never been an independent Macedonian state. The Macedonian nation is an "artificial creation," an "invention" of Tito, who "baptized" a "mosaic of nationalities" with the Greek name "Macedonians."
  Similarly, because the language spoken by the ancient Macedonians was Greek, the Slavic language spoken by the "Skopians" cannot be called "the Macedonian language." Greek sources generally refer to it as "the linguistic idiom of Skopje" and describe it as a corrupt and impoverished dialect of Bulgarian. Finally, the Greek government denies the existence of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece, claiming that there exists only a small group of "Slavophone Hellenes" or "bilingual Greeks," who speak Greek and "a local Slavic dialect" but have a "Greek national consciousness" (Kofos 1964:226).
  From the Greek nationalist perspective, then, the use of the name "Macedonian" by the "Slavs of Skopje" constitutes a "felony," an "act of plagiarism" against the Greek people. By calling themselves "Macedonians" the Slavs are "stealing" a Greek name; they are "embezzling" Greek cultural heritage; they are "falsifying" Greek history. As Evangelos Kofos, a historian employed by the Greek Foreign Ministry told a foreign reporter "It is as if a robber came into my house and stole my most precious jewels - my history, my culture, my identity" (The Boston Globe Jan. 5, 1993, p.9).
  Macedonians, on the other hand, are committed to affirming their existence as a unique people with a unique history, culture, and identity, and to gaining recognition of this fact internationally. In asserting what they sometimes refer to as their "ethnospecificity," Macedonians insist they are not Serbs, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, or Greeks.5 They also reject hyphenated names such as Yugoslav -Macedonian or Greek-Macedonian as "divisive labels" indicative of a "partition mentality" that needs to be overcome. There are no Slav-Macedonians, either, anymore than there are Slav-Russians or Slav-Poles. According to many Macedonians, Greeks and Bulgarians who live in Macedonia (whose nationality is Greek or Bulgarian) may identify themselves as "Macedonians," but in a regional or geographical sense only.
  Extreme Macedonian nationalists, who are concerned with demonstrating the continuity between ancient and modern Macedonians, deny that they are Slavs and claim to be the direct descendants of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians. The more moderate Macedonian position, generally adopted by better educated Macedonians and publicly endorsed by Kiro Gligorov, the first president of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia, is that modern Macedonians have no relation to Alexander the Great, but are a Slavic people whose ancestors arrived in Macedonia in the sixth century AD. Proponents of both the extreme and the moderate Macedonian positions, nevertheless, stress that the ancient Macedonians were a distinct non-Greek people.
  In addition to affirming the existence of the Macedonian nation, Macedonians are concerned with affirming the existence of a unique Macedonian language as well. While acknowledging the similarities between Macedonian and other South Slavic languages, they point to the distinctions that set it apart as a separate language. They also emphasize that although standard literary Macedonian was only formally created and recognized in 1944, the Macedonian language has a history of over a thousand years dating back to the Old Church Slavonic used by Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the ninth century.
  Although all Macedonians agree that Macedonian minorities exist in Bulgaria and Greece and that these minorities have been subjected to harsh policies of forced assimilation, there are two different positions with regard to what their future should be. The goal of more extreme Macedonian nationalists is to create a "free, united, and independent Macedonia" by liberating" the parts of Macedonia "temporarily occupied" by Bulgaria and Greece. More moderate Macedonian nationalists recognize the inviolability of the Bulgarian and Greek borders and explicitly renounce any territorial claims against the two countries. They do, however, demand that Bulgaria and Greece recognize the existence of Macedonian minorities in their countries and grant them the basic human rights they deserve.[6]
 

4. Transnational National Communities

  Until recently studies of ethnic nationalism have focused primarily on the relationships between ethnic minorities and nation-states.[7] It is no longer possible, however, to understand ethnic and national conflicts in terms of these units of analysis alone. With diaspora communities and international organizations playing important roles in nationalist struggles throughout the world, contemporary studies of ethnic nationalism must adopt a more global perspective.
  Current work on the phenomenon of globalization offers a valuable perspective from which to analyze the new forms taken by national conflicts like the Macedonian Question. Globalization theory shifts our attention away from distinct national societies and cultures and directs it toward consideration of the process by which "the world has become a single place." It leads us to examine how "the world--as-a-whole" is organized.[8]
  In contrast to the expectations of many, this process of globalization has not meant the end of nationalism. It has not brought about the demise of nation-states or the obsolescence of the national identities associated with them, nor has it led to the development of one homogeneous global culture. The European Community and the United Nations have not replaced Greece or Macedonia as important foci of collective identity. Instead Greeks and Macedonians in the Balkans and in the diaspora have begun to carry out their nationalist struggles on a global scale. The globalization of culture involves the simultaneous and contradictory processes of cultural integration and cultural disintegration (Featherstone 1990b:1). A "United Europe" is coming into being, Yugoslavia is falling apart, and nationalist conflict between Greeks and Macedonians has spread from the Balkans to Canada and Australia.
  In this era of globalization national communities are being imagined" in a new way (Anderson 1983). We are witnessing the construction of transnational national communities. The primordial sentiments of region, ethnicity, language, and religion have become globalized (Appadurai 1990); they have spread throughout the world to unite vast networks of people who remain loyal to a national homeland even though they no longer inhabit it. National communities are not being replaced by transnational ones; they are just being constructed on a transnational scale.
  Two important developments have made possible the emergence of transnational national communities as major forces in world political affairs in the second half of the twentieth century. The internationalization of labor and the waves of labor migration that took place in the decades following World War II has led to the creation of large diaspora communities scattered throughout the world. As a result of recent developments in the fields of communication and transportation, it is now possible for these diaspora communities to remain much more deeply involved in the national struggles of their homelands than was ever possible in the past. Although members of diaspora communities no longer inhabit their national homelands, these homelands still play an important role in shaping their sense of collective identity. People of the diaspora continue to be members of the nations whose territories they have left behind.
  Diaspora communities are able to maintain their ties to their homelands and to participate in the construction of transnational national communities in a variety of ways. New satellite telecommunications networks, the ease and speed of intercontinental air travel, and the accessibility of new technologies such as fax machines, video equipment, and personal computers, all make it possible for national societies, cultures, and identities to transcend the spatial limits of national boundaries and spread throughout the world in what Appadurai has called "global cultural flows" of people, money, information, and images (1990).
  In addition these global cultural flows have enabled local communities and identities to retain their meaning and power in the face of the threats posed by the forces of deterritorialization and globalization. A depopulated village in northern Greece with only a few hundred inhabitants may have thriving émigré communities of several thousand living in Canada and Australia. Village associations whose organizational structure parallels that of the local village government, celebrate village festivals with dances, picnics, and barbecues in Toronto and Melbourne.
  Members of diaspora communities maintain contact with relatives in villages in their homelands through regular phone calls and frequent visits; they watch video tapes of village weddings and festivals in their living rooms in Toronto and Melbourne; and they contribute money to support schools, churches, and athletic teams in the villages of their birth. In addition, members of diaspora communities are often able to follow political developments in their homelands through ethnic media which rebroadcast or reprint material directly from sources in the national capital.
  In this way the centrifugal forces that fragmented territorially based nations and created diaspora communities around the world have been offset by the centripetal effect of these global cultural flows. The deterritorialization of national communities has not meant the death of nationalism by any means. It has meant the creation of complex transnational networks in which the problems of cultural reproduction for diaspora communities abroad have become tied to the politics of ethnic nationalism at home (Appadurai 1990:11).
  Diaspora communities that have been established in pluralistic Western democracies like the United States, Canada, and Australia are particularly well situated to play an active role in the construction of transnational national communities. The multicultural policies that have been adopted to one degree or another in these host countries have encouraged immigrants to continue to define themselves in terms of their ethnic or national origin. They have also made it possible for the home countries of these immigrants to become actively involved in the educational and religious activities of the diaspora. Members of these diasporas who have experienced significant upward social mobility possess educational, occupational, and financial resources that enable them to make important contributions to national causes involving their homelands. The democratic nature of the political systems of these host countries means that they are very sensitive to lobbying efforts conducted by diaspora communities on behalf of their homelands. Well-organized and politically mobilized diaspora communities can, therefore, play an important part in a triadic set of relationships involving diaspora communities themselves, their host countries, and their countries of origin (Esman 1986:349).
  The conflict between Greeks and Macedonians over which group has the right to identify itself as Macedonians is an excellent example of what Featherstone (1990:10) has called a "global cultural war" involving two transnational national communities, each composed of a Balkan nation-state and diaspora communities in multicultural societies like the United States, Canada, and Australia. The Greek transnational national community is described by Greek politicians with references to "Greece of the Five Continents" and descriptions of Greeks in the diaspora as "the most powerful weapon" in the arsenal of "World Hellenism." This notion of "World Hellenism" as a reified nationality" which transcends the territorial boundaries of the Greek state was expressed vividly in a lecture given by a Greek economist teaching at a Canadian University during an international conference on Greeks in the English-speaking diaspora held in Melbourne in 1992. He compared "the Great Greece of World Hellenism" to a beautiful butterfly whose body was Greece and whose wings, "its most precious asset which keeps it alive and aloft," were the diaspora (Triantis 1992).
  The Macedonian transnational national community, like its Greek counterpart, consists of a variety of institutions linking the Republic of Macedonia with Macedonians of the diaspora. Among the most important of these is the Center for Macedonians Abroad, whose official name - The Queen Bee of Emigrants from Macedonia - clearly conveys the image of the national homeland as a powerful mother who keeps her diaspora children working busily to promote her interests. In the early 1990s, when the Republic of Macedonia was struggling to gain international recognition, several transnational organizations were established in order to assist in this effort. They include the World Macedonian Congress, the International Macedonian Lobby, and the Macedonian Information and Liaison Service in Brussels, a daily news service which provides world-wide distribution by fax and electronic mail of political and economic developments in Macedonia. From its inception the movement for the human rights of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece has also had an important transnational dimension.
  In addition to focusing on the growth of transnational national communities, contemporary studies of ethnic nationalism must also take into account the increasingly important role played in world affairs by international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Community, the World Bank, and the Nonaligned Movement. Each of these organizations constitutes an international forum in which national conflicts can be raised, monitored, and arbitrated. It is to these organizations that nations and states must now turn when they seek recognition, legitimacy, or support.
  The culture which pervades organizations like the United Nations and the European Community is the culture of international business, law, and diplomacy. This "third culture" (Unseem et al. 1963), in which transnational communication at virtually all official levels takes place, has as its central values universalist concepts, ultimately European in origin, of individual equality, personal freedom, and human rights.9 It is ironic that organizations espousing these values, which are so fundamentally at odds with the values of nationalism, were originally established by nation-states and have come to exert a great deal of control over both the external and internal affairs of these states. In the global world of the late twentieth century, then, national conflicts are being fought paradoxically on a transnational level. Relationships between nation-states and ethnic minorities within their boundaries are no longer the private, internal affairs of state they once were. Now they frequently often involve diaspora communities of both the dominant national group and the ethnic minority, their host countries, as well as various international organizations.
  The net effect of all these developments on issues of ethnic nationalism is often quite dramatic. Ethnic minorities struggling for recognition and human rights from the nation-states they inhabit attempt to mobilize the support of diaspora communities abroad, which in turn attempt to enlist the help of their host countries. Ethnic minorities also seek to shift the balance of power in their favor and away from the nation-states they are struggling against by appealing to international organizations. The commitment of these organizations to human rights and cultural pluralism often makes them much more responsive to the concerns of ethnic minorities than national governments with their commitment to nationalist ideologies of purity and homogeneity. [10]
 

5. Macedonian Human Rights and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

  According to the 1990 Country Report on Human Rights Practices published by the United States Department of State (1991:1172) there are between 20,000 and 50,000 Slavic-speakers in northern Greece, most of whom live in the relatively underdeveloped area along the Greek-Yugoslavia border. While the vast majority of these people have a Greek national identity, a significant number of them (perhaps 5,000-10,000) have a Macedonian national identity; that is, they identify themselves as Macedonians, not as Greeks. Since the mid 1980s a small number of Macedonians (many of whose families were severely persecuted at the time of the Greek Civil War) have become politically active and begun to demand human rights for the Macedonian minority in Greece.[11]
  In 1984 a Committee for Macedonian Human Rights was established in northern Greece. In the next few years similar organizations were formed by Aegean Macedonians in diaspora communities in Canada and Australia.[12] Among the goals of these groups are the repeal of several specific laws which discriminate against Macedonians. One law (passed in 1982) denies the right of all political refugees who left Greece after the Civil War to return to Greece unless they are "Greek by birth." Another law (passed in 1983) ceases to recognize university degrees obtained in the Republic of Macedonia on the grounds that Macedonian is not an internationally recognized language.
  More generally these Macedonian human rights groups seek the recognition by the Greek government of the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece. They are working to end discrimination against Macedonians in Greece in the fields of education and employment, as well as in other areas of cultural, social, and political life. They want Macedonians in Greece to have the right to attend church services in Macedonian, to receive their primary and secondary education in Macedonian, and to publish newspapers and broadcast radio and television programs in Macedonian. They also want the right to establish Macedonian cultural organizations, such as the Center for Macedonian Culture, which was formed in Florina in 1984, but which in three separate court decisions has been refused legal recognition on the grounds that it is a separatist organization and poses a threat to national security. Finally, these groups have protested police interference with village festivals where Macedonian folk songs and dances are performed, as well as the harassment and persecution of Macedonian human rights activists, some of whom have been denied entry into Greece, deprived of their Greek citizenship, dismissed from their jobs, and even tried and sentenced to prison for asserting their Macedonian identity. [13]
          Since the publication of their initial manifesto in 1984, Macedonian activists in northern Greece have worked closely with leaders of Aegean Macedonian diaspora communities in Canada and Australia. On several occasions human rights activists from the region of Florina in northern Greece have traveled to Toronto, Perth, and Melbourne in order to raise money for their cause and to foster cooperation between Macedonians in the diaspora and those in the homeland. This transnational Macedonian human rights network was well developed by 1988, when a variety of protests and demonstrations on behalf of the human rights of Macedonians in northern Greece took place in cities throughout the world.
          In February of 1988 the Federation of Macedonian Associations of Victoria organized a demonstration to protest the First International Congress of Macedonian Studies, a conference organized by Greek and Greek-Australian academics whose goal was to demonstrate "the Greekness of Macedonia" from antiquity to the present (Danforth 1990). In June and July of that year, the First International Reunion of Child Refuges of Aegean Macedonian was held in Skopje, at which a resolution was adopted urging the Greek government to allow Macedonian political refugees who left Greece after the Greek Civil War to return to Greece. On August 10, 1988, the 75th anniversary of the Treaty of Bucharest (the treaty that partitioned the Ottoman administrative region of Macedonia among Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece), the Macedonian National Committee of Toronto staged a demonstration at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York calling on Greece and Bulgaria to respect the human rights of their Macedonian minorities.
          Then, in May 1989, an international Macedonian delegation, consisting of representatives from northern Greece, Canada, and Australia, visited the Center for Human Rights of the United Nations in Geneva as well as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The delegation had several objectives. They wanted to draw the attention of European officials to the situation of the Macedonian minorities in Greece and to lobby for political action which would lead to a change in current Greek policies. They also wanted to gather information about the various political and legal options available to them for the advancement of the human rights of the Macedonian minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. One of the most important outcomes of these meetings was the realization that the best course of action open to them was to file a complaint with the European Commission on Human Rights alleging that by its treatment of its Macedonian minority Greece was in violation the Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe.[14]
          Shortly thereafter, in November, 1989, the Yugoslav representative to the United Nations accused Greece of oppressing the human rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece. This was the first time the Macedonian Question had been raised by the Yugoslav government since the period following the Greek Civil War, a clear indication that the tight grip which federal authorities under Tito had kept on the nationalist tendencies of Yugoslavia's constituent nations had begun to relax. Two other incidents offer further evidence that during this period the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was beginning to enjoy increasing freedom from the Yugoslav federal government to adopt more nationalist positions. In February, 1990, a large demonstration took place in Skopje to protest the violation of the human rights of the Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. Then in May, 1990, 50,000 Macedonians blocked the border crossings between Yugoslavia and Greece in an effort to convince the Greek government to recognize its Macedonian minority and to persuade the Yugoslav government to pressure the Greek government to move in this direction as well.
          The most impressive accomplishment of the transnational Macedonian human rights movement, however, has been to organize delegations to attend several meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place in the early 1990s. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the "Helsinki process," is an on-going international political movement dedicated to promoting the causes of peace, human rights, and social and economic cooperation. The CSCE originally involved all the countries of Europe except Albania, as well as the former Soviet Union, Canada, and the United States. In 1975 the leaders of the 35 participating states met in Helsinki, Finland and signed what have come to be known as the Helsinki Accords, a document containing a declaration of principles governing relations between states; these include respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the self-determination of peoples, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the inviolability of frontiers. They also include provisions concerning economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation, as well as provisions regarding cultural cooperation, educational exchanges, and the free flow of information.
          The signing of the Helsinki Accords initiated a series of follow-up meetings to review implementation of the Helsinki provisions and if necessary to enhance them as well. The Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE, which was signed in 1989, significantly strengthened the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. It alluded specifically to the rights of minorities and to the right of citizens to monitor the human rights performance of the governments of their own countries. It also established a continuous process of human rights review through an agreement to hold three yearly meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE.
          The second meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension was held in Copenhagen in June of 1990. It was attended by an international Macedonian delegation which consisted of fifteen members from eight countries. The "internal" delegates included one from Bulgarian or Pirin Macedonia, two from Greek or Aegean Macedonia, and four from the Republic of Macedonia. The "external" delegates included two from Australia, three from Canada, and one each from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. [15] The majority of the delegates were there as representatives of local Macedonian Human. Rights Committees or local branches of the Association of Child Refugees from Aegean Macedonia. The leaders of the delegation were particularly pleased that they had been able to assemble for the first time "a united Macedonian delegation on a world scale."
          The Macedonian delegation participated in the Copenhagen conference as an officially recognized non-governmental organization (NGO), as did such groups as the Albanians of Kosovo, the Hungarians of Rumania, the Armenians, and the Kurds. In that capacity it attended both the official meetings and the parallel NGO activities, which included a variety of seminars and workshops on human rights issues. The two major goals of the Macedonian delegation were to persuade as many of the Official state delegations as they could to address the situation of the Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece in the Final Document of the meeting and to raise the issue of Macedonian human rights directly with the governments of Bulgaria and Greece.
          Early in the conference Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands introduced a proposal on national minorities, a topic which was clearly going to be one of the central issues of the conference. In his introduction to the proposal a Canadian delegate pointed out that since no one could ever draw "a perfect map of Europe," national minorities would always exist. He called on all governments to demonstrate tolerance, respect, and understanding toward these minorities. After noting that Canada and many other participating state have interpreted the term "national minority" as used in the Helsinki Accords to include "ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious minorities," he condemned the practice by which some states attempted to evade their CSCE commitments regarding national minorities by claiming that no national minorities existed within their borders. After outlining Canada's multicultural policies and describing the cultural mosaic that constitutes Canadian society, he concluded by stressing the value of promoting the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of all minority groups.
          A very different tone was conveyed by the head of the Greek delegation in his presentation to the conference several days later. After emphasizing that the issue of minorities was not only one of human rights, but above all an important social problem with major political consequences, he urged member states not to "attempt to further codify the rights of persons belonging to minorities," but instead to convene a meeting of experts to further study the concept of minorities in order to arrive at a common understanding of the complexities of the issue.
          On June 21, the Yugoslav delegation to the conference introduced a "Memorandum relating to the Macedonian national minority" which accused the governments of Bulgaria and Greece of a number of specific violations of the human rights of the members of the Macedonian national minorities living in their countries. It also charged the two countries with failing to fulfill their commitments to this minority under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE. The Yugoslav memorandum closed by calling on the governments of Bulgaria and Greece to submit reports on the steps they have taken to protect the rights of the Macedonian minorities in their countries at the next meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE to be held in Moscow the following year.
          A few days later the head of the Greek delegation issued a sharp reply to the Yugoslav memorandum in which he accused the Yugoslav delegation of undermining CSCE efforts to safeguard minority rights by manipulating the issue in the service of extremist, adventurist, and irredentist policies. He drew attention to the "negative record of human and minority rights violations in Yugoslav Macedonia" and referred specifically to the mistreatment of the Albanian and Serbian minorities in the Republic of Macedonia. He then defended the human rights record of Greece and pointed out that as "a member of the democratic family of the European Community," Greece has ratified a variety of international human rights instruments. Finally, he stated that the Macedonian problem was a non-issue and simply denied that a Macedonian national minority existed in Greece. Any assertion to the contrary, he insisted, was an attempt to usurp the name and identity of two and a half million Greek-Macedonians and therefore constituted a gross violation of their human rights.
          The position of the official Greek delegation was supported by an open letter sent to conference participants by the Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario, a Greek-Macedonian organization, several of whose members were present at the Copenhagen meeting. They accused "Slav-Macedonian emigres" under the direction of the authorities in Skopje of trying to detach Greek Macedonia from the Greek state under the pretext of human rights -- of using, in other words, a "human rights approach" to advance territorial claims against Greek Macedonia. In their meetings with other delegations, the representatives of the Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario insisted that the only Macedonians, the "real" Macedonians, were Greeks.
          To further complicate the situation, representatives of the Association of Macedonian Societies in Bulgaria who were attending the Copenhagen meeting filed a memorandum in which they argued that the Macedonian nation was an artificial creation of Serbia and that all the Slavs of Macedonia were actually Bulgarians. After documenting the persecution of inhabitants of Yugoslav Macedonia who had a Bulgarian national identity, this memorandum criticized statements asserting the existence of a "Macedonian Nation" as part of a campaign to conquer all of Macedonia being carried out by "Great Serbian Jingoists." The memorandum concluded with an urgent call for the recognition of the human rights of the Bulgarian minorities of Yugoslavia and Greece. Needless to say, some of the representatives of the 35 participating CSCE states were confused by their encounters with three different groups of people each of which identified itself as a Macedonian delegation but each of which offered a different definition of who the Macedonians really were.
          At one point during the conference, a member of the official Greek delegation attempted to prevent the Macedonian delegation from distributing its literature at the information stand which had been set up at the entrance to the main conference center in order to publicize the activities of the various non-governmental organizations. An attendant at the information stand saw the Deputy Head of the Greek delegation remove large quantities of the Macedonian delegation's literature. When she notified her supervisor, he asked the Greek delegate to stop. The next day the Head of the Greek delegation officially requested that the conference Secretariat remove the information stand of the non-governmental organizations. When this request was denied, the Greek delegation called for the suspension of the Macedonian delegation's right to use the stand. This request, however, was also denied.
          Several days later the Macedonian delegation held a press conference, which was sponsored by the Yugoslav delegation.[16] In addition to presenting their case more generally, the Macedonian delegates attempted to publicize this particular incident as widely as possible. Danish newspapers published articles under headlines that read "Attempt to censure the Macedonians" and "Literature of a minority removed." As members of the Macedonian delegation later reported, many conference participants were left wondering "if attempts to deny Macedonians basic rights are made at an international conference on human rights, then what must the situation be like for them in Greece itself?"
          The Final Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, which was adopted by consensus, is a general reaffirmation of the commitment of the participating states to democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and human rights, which was expressed in both the Helsinki Accords and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE. The section of the document dealing with the issue of national minorities affirms that "persons belonging to national minorities have the right to exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law." In an attempt to define the term "national minority," the document states that belonging to a national minority "is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice." More specifically it declares that
 
 Persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve, and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will.
          This explicitly includes the right of national minorities to establish their own cultural associations and to conduct religious and educational activities in their mother tongue.[17]
 

6. Conclusion

          Macedonian human rights activists - farmers and civil servants from northern Greece, as well as lawyers, business men, manual laborers, and students from Canada and Australia - state unequivocally that they reject the irredentist concept of "a Greater Macedonia" and that they do not want to change the present international borders in the Balkans.[18] The Europeans are tearing down walls and opening borders, they say. Why would they want to build new ones? That would mean war, and no one wants war. As a model for the future, a model for change, they look not to the violent process of disintegration taking place in Yugoslavia, but to its antithesis, the peaceful process of integration taking place simultaneously in Europe. In describing their political goals they appeal to the concept of a united Europe, a Europe without borders. In such a world borders would be meaningless, travel and communication would be unrestricted, and Macedonians, wherever they lived, would be united and free.
          These Macedonian human rights activists, in other words, are looking forward idealistically to the end of the nation-state and to the rise of pluralistic transnational communities such as "the new Europe." Until that rather distant goal is realized, however, they are attempting to gain human rights for the Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece by constructing their own transnational community, a community epitomized by the "international Macedonian delegation" to the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. Drawing on the personal experiences of discrimination of the "internal" delegates from Bulgaria and Greece as well as the professional expertise of the "external" delegates - judges and lawyers raised in the multicultural societies of Canada and Australia - this delegation effectively exposed the failure of the Greek state with its commitment to a nationalist ideology of ethnic homogeneity and purity to treat its Macedonian minority in a manner consistent with its obligations to the international human rights accords it has signed. In doing so the Macedonian delegation took full advantage of the forum provided by the CSCE, a transnational organization committed to pluralism and the protection of the rights of national minorities defined on the basis of the principle of self-identification. In this way, then, national minorities like the Macedonians are gradually beginning to shift the balance of power in their favor and away from nation-states like Bulgaria and Greece which they are struggling against.
          Macedonian human rights activists are motivated by a desire to protect the human rights of the Macedonian national minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. They want to preserve, or more accurately perhaps, to create a Macedonian national identity among people who have been for almost a century the targets of Bulgarian or Greek assimilationist policies. The nationalism of Macedonian human rights activists is muted, for strictly speaking it is inconsistent with the human rights discourse to which they are committed. But it is nationalism nonetheless, a counter-nationalism, which developed at least partially in reaction to the nationalist policies of Bulgaria and Greece. And in its more extreme forms Macedonian nationalism is characterized by the same narrowness and intolerance as the Bulgarian and Greek nationalisms which Macedonians have struggled against for so long.
              It is one of the fundamental ironies of the Macedonian human rights movement, therefore, that coexisting in uneasy tension with an explicit commitment to pluralism and respect for the principle of self-identification lies an implicit commitment to a diametrically opposed ideology - the ideology of Macedonian nationalism. Macedonian human rights activists, who have suffered the negative consequences of the nationalist ideologies of Bulgaria and Greece, are also, to a degree at least, Macedonian nationalists. The international Macedonian delegation to Copenhagen was still in the final analysis a national delegation, just as the Macedonian transnational community is still a national community. 

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NOTES
This essay is part of a forthcoming book tentatively entitled The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World to be published by Princeton University Press. The research on which this project is based includes short periods of fieldwork carried out in the region of Florina in northern Greece in 1990 and in Toronto, Canada in 1991, both supported by a Roger C. Schmutz Faculty Research Grant from Bates College. It also includes an extended period of fieldwork conducted in Melbourne, Australia, in 1991-92, supported by a Fulbright Scholar Award. Thanks to a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities I was able to devote the 1992-93 academic year to this project as well. My work on the Macedonian Question has benefited from the advice and the moral support of several fine colleagues: Victor Friedman, Roger Just, Michael Herzfeld, Anastasia Karakasidou, and Riki van Boeschoten. I take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to them all.

1.     In this essay, as in general political, scholarly, and journalistic discourse, the term Macedonian is used in a national sense to refer to people with a Macedonian national identity. According to this usage, "Macedonian" and "Greek" are mutually exclusive categories referring to people with two different national identities. "Macedonian" is also used in a regional sense to refer to people with a Greek national identity who come from Macedonia. These people often refer to themselves as "Greek-Macedonians."
2.     For detailed accounts of the events of this period see Perry (1988) Dakin and (1966).
3.     For a Greek perspective on the history of the Macedonian Question see Kofos
(1964 and 1989) and Martis (1983); for a Macedonian perspective see Tashkovski
(1976) and articles published in the Macedonian Review. For other perspectives
see Danforth (1993), Friedman (1975), Jelavich (1983), Lunt (1984), Palmer and
King (1971), and Wilkinson (195i).
4.     The general consensus among ancient historians is that in their own time the ancient Macedonians were perceived by the Greeks and by themselves not to be Greek. See Badian (1982), Borza (1990:96), and Hammond (1986:535). On continuity in Greek culture see Herzfeld (1982 and 1987). On the construction of Greek national identity see Kitromilides (1989).
5.     It must be noted that the construction of a distinct Macedonian national identity is a relatively recent phenomenon even by Balkan standards. Its origins can be traced to the work of a small group of late nineteenth- and early twentieth -century intellectuals like Krste Misirkov, who in 1903 called for the "recognition of the Slavs in Macedonia as a separate nationality - Macedonians" (Misirkov 1974:73). At this time, however, the majority of the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Macedonia were illiterate peasants with no clearly developed sense of national identity see Friedman (1975).
6.     For statements of this moderate position see Karakasidou (1993:13-14), Popov and Radin (1989:73), the response by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Macedonia to the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia sponsored by the European Community, and the comments of Macedonian human rights activists in northern Greece published in the Greek periodical Ena March 11, 1992.
7.     Important work on ethnic nationalism includes Brass (1985), Connor (1973 and 1977), Guidieri et al. (1988), and Smith (1981 and 1986).
8.     Robertson (1987: 30). On the concept of globalization see also Featherstone (1990a), and King (1991).
9.     Texts in which these values have been articulated include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights adopted by the European Community in 1950.
10.     For further discussion of these issues see Robertson (1987), Hall (1991), and Wallerstein (1991). Gupta (1992) examines the way Third World nations attempted to strengthen their position in the world system through the establishment of the Nonaligned Movement.
11.     The Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity, an organization committed to protecting the human rights of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece, participated in the 1994 elections for the European Parliament under the name "Rainbow" (a European-wide movement representing the interests of a variety of linguistic and cultural minorities). They received over 7,000 votes, the majority of them from the regions of Florina, Kastoria, and Edhessa.
12.     The term "Aegean Macedonians" is used by Macedonians to refer to Macedonians from northern Greece. Greeks object to the term on the grounds that it implies an unwillingness to recognize Greek sovereignty over Greek Macedonia.
13.     For further information on the situation of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece see the recent report by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki entitled Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece. See also Karakasidou (1993), Popov and Radin (1989), Poulton (1991), and the entry on Greece in recent issues of the United States Department of State's Countrv Reports on Human Rights Practices.
14.     For a full account of the activities of this delegation see Radin and Popov (nd).
15.     The designation of Macedonians from Greece and Bulgaria as "internal" delegates supports Esman's (1986:333) argument that "ethnic groups whose minority status results not from migration, but from conquest, annexation or arbitrary boundary arrangements" differ significantly from diaspora groups and should be considered separately. Esman's position preserves migration as an essential feature of the diaspora experience and avoids equating a national homeland (the entire geographical region of Macedonia) with the state in which a nation is the dominant group (the Republic of Macedonia itself).
16.     According to conference rules, in order to hold a press conference, non--governmental organizations were required to obtain the sponsorship of an official governmental delegation.
17.     The full text of the Final Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE was published by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in June, 1990.
18.     The most complete statement of the goals of the Macedonian human rights movement is contained in Popov and Radin (1989). 

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Copyright Loring M. Danforth