In the present era of globalization ethnic nationalism
can no longer be understood simply as a relationship between an ethnic
minority and the dominant nation of the state in which it lives. With the
deterritorialization of national communities brought about by large-scale
population movements and recent developments in the fields of communications
and transportation, diaspora communities have become deeply involved in
the political affairs of their homelands. As a result transnational national
communities are being constructed, which together with international organizations
like the United Nations and the European Community, are becoming increasingly
important participants in nationalist struggles throughout the world. Nation-states
are being challenged simultaneously from above and below -- from without
and within -- by international organizations on the one hand and by ethnic
minorities on the other. National conilicts are being fought, in other
words, on a transnational level.
In this essay I explore this paradox by examining
the way the issue of the human rights of the Macedonian minority of northern
Greece was dealt with at the 1990 meeting of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). There a transnational Macedonian delegation
made up of representatives from the Republic of Macedonia (which was then
one of the states of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), from Macedonian
minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, and from Macedonian diaspora communities
abroad was able to shift the balance of power in its favor and away from
the Greek nation-state by appealing to the universalist and pluralist definitions
of national identity and human rights that prevail in the context of international
organizations like the CSCE.
2. The Macedonian Question in Balkan History
The Macedonian Question has been a source of conflict
in the Balkans for over a hundred years. During the Ottoman period, which
lasted from the fourteenth century until 1913, the population of the geographical
area known as Macedonia included an amazing number of different ethnic,
linguistic, and religious groups, including Slavic- and Greek-speaking
Orthodox Christians, Turkish- and Albanian-speaking Moslems, Romanian-speaking
Vlachs, Jews, and Gypsies. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the
population of Macedonia was increasingly being defined from various external
nationalist perspectives in terms of national categories such as Greeks,
Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, and Turks. Ottoman authorities, however,
continued to divide the population of the empire into administrative units,
or millets on the basis of religious identity rather than language, ethnicity,
or nationality. The hegemony which the Greeks exercised over the Orthodox
Christian millet was seriously challenged for the first time by the establishment
of an independent Bulgarian Church in 1870. Orthodox communities in "Macedonia"
now had the choice of affiliating with either the Greek or the Bulgarian
national church. This marked an intensification of the "Macedonian Struggle"
in which Greek, Bulgarian, and to a lesser extent Serbian, claims came
into conflict over who would gain control over the people and the territory
By the 1890s the three Balkan states were each fielding
irregular bands of guerrilla fighters who attacked the Turks, fought each
other, and terrorized the local population. In addition, through the construction
of churches and schools and the assignment of priests and teachers, each
state was conducting an intense propaganda campaign, whose goal was to
instill the preferred, or "proper," sense of national identity among the
Orthodox Christians of Macedonia. The Macedonian Struggle
reached its climax in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which ended with the
partitioning of Macedonia among Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia (later a dominant
part of Yugoslavia).
Since 1913 the fates of the Slavic-speaking inhabitants
of Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, Greek (Aegean) Macedonia, and Yugoslav
(Vardar) Macedonia have varied considerably. With the exception of a brief
period following World War II, the Bulgarian government has officially
denied the existence of a Macedonian nation, arguing instead that all the
Slavs of Macedonia are Bulgarians. Since 1948, however, its policy toward
the Macedonians in Bulgaria has been one of forced assimilation into mainstream
The Greek government has also consistently denied
the existence of both a Macedonian nation and a Macedonian minority in
northern Greece and has adopted a policy of assimilation toward the Slavic-speaking
inhabitants of Greek Macedonia. After 1913 all Slavic personal and place
names were Hellenized, and all evidence of the existence of Slavic literacy
was destroyed. As a result of the population exchanges which took place
between Greece and Bulgaria, as well as Greece and Turkey in the 1920s,
the number of people in Greek Macedonia who had a sense of Greek national
identity increased substantially.
Under the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936-40, repression of the Slavic
speakers, who by this time had increasingly begun to identify themselves
as Macedonians, was particularly severe: people who spoke Macedonian were
beaten, fined, and imprisoned. After the Greek Civil War (1946-49), in
which many Macedonians supported the unsuccessful Communist cause, some
35,000 Macedonians fled to Yugoslavia and other countries in eastern Europe
under extremely difficult circumstances (Kofos 1964:186). In the decades
that followed, conservative Greek governments continued this policy of
coercion and assimilation, perhaps the most egregious examples of which
were the "language oaths" administered in several Macedonian villages,
which required Macedonians to swear that they would renounce their "Slavic
dialect" and from then on speak only Greek (Pribichevich 1982:246).
Until World War II the official Serbian (and Yugoslav)
position was that the Slavs of Macedonia did not constitute a distinct
ethnic or national group, but that they were all "South Serbs." On August
2, 1944, however, Tito and the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
established the People's Republic of Macedonia with its capital of Skopje
as one of the states of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At this
time the existence of a Macedonian nation was officially recognized and
a variety of state institutions were established which played an important
role in the construction of a Macedonian national community. The Macedonian
case was part of Tito's more general attempt to create a pluralist and
multinational Yugoslav state. By 1950 a standard literary Macedonian language
had been developed, and in 1967 an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church
was established. In this way Macedonians achieved a significant degree
of cultural autonomy, even if they failed to achieve complete national
With the death of Tito in 1980, the constraints
which the central Yugoslav government had placed on the expression of Macedonian
nationalism were gradually loosened. As Yugoslavia began to collapse in
the early 1990s, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, in a referendum
held on September 8, 1991, voted overwhelmingly in favor of initiating
the process of establishing a completely sovereign and independent Macedonian
The fledgling state of Macedonia, however, faced
a difficult struggle for international recognition because of the fierce
opposition mounted by Greece to what Greeks claim to be the misappropriation
by a Slavic people of the name Macedonia, a name that "was, is, and always
will be Greek." At the insistence of Greece, therefore, in December, 1991,
the European Community stated that it would not recognize the Republic
of Macedonia until it guaranteed that it had no territorial claims against
any neighboring state and that it would not engage in hostile acts against
any such state, including the use of a name which im lied territorial claims.
In an attempt to convince the European Community of its peaceful intentions,
the Macedonian parliament in January, 1992, adopted two amendments to the
Macedonian constitution, which had been in effect for less than a year.
Amendment 1 stated that the Republic had no territorial claims against
any neighboring state and that the borders of the Republic could be changed
only in accordance with "generally accepted international norms," while
Amendment 2 stated that the Republic would not interfere in the internal
affairs of other states. In addition, the first President of Macedonia,
Kiro Gligorov, offered to sign a bilateral agreement with Greece affirming
the permanence of the international border between the two countries. Shortly
thereafter an EC Arbitration Commission found that Macedonia fulfilled
all conditions for recognition. In addition, it specifically stated that
the use of the name "Macedonia" did not imply territorial claims toward
a neighboring state. In spite of this, however, in January, 1992, at the
insistence of Greece, the European Community refused to recognize the Republic
During this period an incredible variety of alternative
names were proposed for Macedonia. Officially the Greek government refused
to accept any name for the Republic which included the word "Macedonia"
in any form whether "as a noun or as an adjectival modifier." Proposed
solutions to the dilemma ranged from names like Dardania and Paeonia (used
in antiquity to designate regions to the north of ancient Macedonia), to
names like South Slavia, the Vardar Republic, the Central Balkan Republic,
and the Republic of Skopje, all of which were acceptable to Greece. Other
compromise solutions, which were not acceptable to Greece, included Northern
Macedonia, New Macedonia, and the Slavic Republic of Macedonia. At one
point Greece even suggested that the Republic adopt two names, one official
name for external use (which could not include the word "Macedonia") and
one unofficial name for internal consumption (which could include the word
"Macedonia"). All these solutions, however, were rejected by the Republic
itself, which insisted that it would only accept recognition under its
constitutional name: the Republic of Macedonia.
In December, 1992, the dispute shifted from the
capitals of the member states of the European Community to New York City,
when the Republic of Macedonia applied for admission to the United Nations.
The governments of both Greece and Macedonia were ready to compromise when
a plan was proposed according to which the Republic would be admitted to
the United Nations under the temporary or provisional name "the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," with a permanent name to be chosen later
through a process of mediation. In April, 1993, the Security Council voted
unanimously to admit "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as a member
of the United Nations. The Republic, however, was not allowed to fly its
flag, the sixteen-ray sun or star of Vergina at the United Nations headquarters
because according to Greece this was the emblem of the ancient Macedonians
(who were Greek) and is therefore a Greek national symbol.
Finally, in December, 1993, just before Greece was
to assume the rotating presidency of the European Community, six members
of the European Community -Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark,
and the Netherlands - decided to recognize the Republic of Macedonia under
the name "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and establish full
diplomatic relations with it. Admission to the UN and recognition by the
major democracies of Western Europe will, one would hope, bring an end
to the economic chaos and political instability which has characterized
the two years of limbo during which the Republic of Macedonia has struggled
unsuccessfully for international acceptance and recognition.
3. Competing Claims to Macedonian Identity
According to the Greek nationalist position on the Macedonian
Question, because Alexander the
Great and the ancient Macedonians were Greeks, ancient and modern Greece
are bound in an unbroken line of racial and cultural continuity.
It is only Greeks, therefore, who have the right to identify themselves
as Macedonians, not the Slavs of southern Yugoslavia, who settled in Macedonia
in the sixth century AD and who called themselves "Bulgarians" until 1944.
Greeks, therefore, generally refer to Macedonians as "Skopians," a practice
comparable to calling Greeks "Athenians."
The negation of Macedonian identity in Greek nationalist ideology
focuses on three main points: the existence of a Macedonian nation, a Macedonian
language, and a Macedonian minority in Greece. From the Greek nationalist
perspective there cannot be a Macedonian nation since there has never been
an independent Macedonian state. The Macedonian nation is an "artificial
creation," an "invention" of Tito, who "baptized" a "mosaic of nationalities"
with the Greek name "Macedonians."
Similarly, because the language spoken by the ancient Macedonians
was Greek, the Slavic language spoken by the "Skopians" cannot be called
"the Macedonian language." Greek sources generally refer to it as "the
linguistic idiom of Skopje" and describe it as a corrupt and impoverished
dialect of Bulgarian. Finally, the Greek government denies the existence
of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece, claiming that there exists
only a small group of "Slavophone Hellenes" or "bilingual Greeks," who
speak Greek and "a local Slavic dialect" but have a "Greek national consciousness"
From the Greek nationalist perspective, then, the use of the
name "Macedonian" by the "Slavs of Skopje" constitutes a "felony," an "act
of plagiarism" against the Greek people. By calling themselves "Macedonians"
the Slavs are "stealing" a Greek name; they are "embezzling" Greek cultural
heritage; they are "falsifying" Greek history. As Evangelos Kofos, a historian
employed by the Greek Foreign Ministry told a foreign reporter "It is as
if a robber came into my house and stole my most precious jewels - my history,
my culture, my identity" (The Boston Globe Jan. 5, 1993, p.9).
Macedonians, on the other hand, are committed to affirming their
existence as a unique people with a unique history, culture, and identity,
and to gaining recognition of this fact internationally. In asserting what
they sometimes refer to as their "ethnospecificity," Macedonians insist
they are not Serbs, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, or Greeks.5 They also reject
hyphenated names such as Yugoslav -Macedonian or Greek-Macedonian as "divisive
labels" indicative of a "partition mentality" that needs to be overcome.
There are no Slav-Macedonians, either, anymore than there are Slav-Russians
or Slav-Poles. According to many Macedonians, Greeks and Bulgarians who
live in Macedonia (whose nationality is Greek or Bulgarian) may identify
themselves as "Macedonians," but in a regional or geographical sense only.
Extreme Macedonian nationalists, who are concerned with demonstrating
the continuity between ancient and modern Macedonians, deny that they are
Slavs and claim to be the direct descendants of Alexander the Great and
the ancient Macedonians. The more moderate Macedonian position, generally
adopted by better educated Macedonians and publicly endorsed by Kiro Gligorov,
the first president of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia, is
that modern Macedonians have no relation to Alexander the Great, but are
a Slavic people whose ancestors arrived in Macedonia in the sixth century
AD. Proponents of both the extreme and the moderate Macedonian positions,
nevertheless, stress that the ancient Macedonians were a distinct non-Greek
In addition to affirming the existence of the Macedonian nation,
Macedonians are concerned with affirming the existence of a unique Macedonian
language as well. While acknowledging the similarities between Macedonian
and other South Slavic languages, they point to the distinctions that set
it apart as a separate language. They also emphasize that although standard
literary Macedonian was only formally created and recognized in 1944, the
Macedonian language has a history of over a thousand years dating back
to the Old Church Slavonic used by Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the ninth
Although all Macedonians agree that Macedonian minorities exist
in Bulgaria and Greece and that these minorities have been subjected to
harsh policies of forced assimilation, there are two different positions
with regard to what their future should be. The goal of more extreme Macedonian
nationalists is to create a "free, united, and independent Macedonia" by
liberating" the parts of Macedonia "temporarily occupied" by Bulgaria and
Greece. More moderate Macedonian nationalists recognize the inviolability
of the Bulgarian and Greek borders and explicitly renounce any territorial
claims against the two countries. They do, however, demand that Bulgaria
and Greece recognize the existence of Macedonian minorities in their countries
and grant them the basic human rights they deserve.
4. Transnational National Communities
Until recently studies of ethnic nationalism have focused primarily
on the relationships between ethnic minorities and nation-states.
It is no longer possible, however, to understand ethnic and national conflicts
in terms of these units of analysis alone. With diaspora communities and
international organizations playing important roles in nationalist struggles
throughout the world, contemporary studies of ethnic nationalism must adopt
a more global perspective.
Current work on the phenomenon of globalization offers a valuable
perspective from which to analyze the new forms taken by national conflicts
like the Macedonian Question. Globalization theory shifts our attention
away from distinct national societies and cultures and directs it toward
consideration of the process by which "the world has become a single place."
It leads us to examine how "the world--as-a-whole" is organized.
In contrast to the expectations of many, this process of globalization
has not meant the end of nationalism. It has not brought about the demise
of nation-states or the obsolescence of the national identities associated
with them, nor has it led to the development of one homogeneous global
culture. The European Community and the United Nations have not replaced
Greece or Macedonia as important foci of collective identity. Instead Greeks
and Macedonians in the Balkans and in the diaspora have begun to carry
out their nationalist struggles on a global scale. The globalization of
culture involves the simultaneous and contradictory processes of cultural
integration and cultural disintegration (Featherstone 1990b:1). A "United
Europe" is coming into being, Yugoslavia is falling apart, and nationalist
conflict between Greeks and Macedonians has spread from the Balkans to
Canada and Australia.
In this era of globalization national communities are being
imagined" in a new way (Anderson 1983). We are witnessing the construction
of transnational national communities. The primordial sentiments of region,
ethnicity, language, and religion have become globalized (Appadurai 1990);
they have spread throughout the world to unite vast networks of people
who remain loyal to a national homeland even though they no longer inhabit
it. National communities are not being replaced by transnational ones;
they are just being constructed on a transnational scale.
Two important developments have made possible the emergence
of transnational national communities as major forces in world political
affairs in the second half of the twentieth century. The internationalization
of labor and the waves of labor migration that took place in the decades
following World War II has led to the creation of large diaspora communities
scattered throughout the world. As a result of recent developments in the
fields of communication and transportation, it is now possible for these
diaspora communities to remain much more deeply involved in the national
struggles of their homelands than was ever possible in the past. Although
members of diaspora communities no longer inhabit their national homelands,
these homelands still play an important role in shaping their sense of
collective identity. People of the diaspora continue to be members of the
nations whose territories they have left behind.
Diaspora communities are able to maintain their ties to their
homelands and to participate in the construction of transnational national
communities in a variety of ways. New satellite telecommunications networks,
the ease and speed of intercontinental air travel, and the accessibility
of new technologies such as fax machines, video equipment, and personal
computers, all make it possible for national societies, cultures, and identities
to transcend the spatial limits of national boundaries and spread throughout
the world in what Appadurai has called "global cultural flows" of people,
money, information, and images (1990).
In addition these global cultural flows have enabled local communities
and identities to retain their meaning and power in the face of the threats
posed by the forces of deterritorialization and globalization. A depopulated
village in northern Greece with only a few hundred inhabitants may have
thriving émigré communities of several thousand living in
Canada and Australia. Village associations whose organizational structure
parallels that of the local village government, celebrate village festivals
with dances, picnics, and barbecues in Toronto and Melbourne.
Members of diaspora communities maintain contact with relatives
in villages in their homelands through regular phone calls and frequent
visits; they watch video tapes of village weddings and festivals in their
living rooms in Toronto and Melbourne; and they contribute money to support
schools, churches, and athletic teams in the villages of their birth. In
addition, members of diaspora communities are often able to follow political
developments in their homelands through ethnic media which rebroadcast
or reprint material directly from sources in the national capital.
In this way the centrifugal forces that fragmented territorially
based nations and created diaspora communities around the world have been
offset by the centripetal effect of these global cultural flows. The deterritorialization
of national communities has not meant the death of nationalism by any means.
It has meant the creation of complex transnational networks in which the
problems of cultural reproduction for diaspora communities abroad have
become tied to the politics of ethnic nationalism at home (Appadurai 1990:11).
Diaspora communities that have been established in pluralistic
Western democracies like the United States, Canada, and Australia are particularly
well situated to play an active role in the construction of transnational
national communities. The multicultural policies that have been adopted
to one degree or another in these host countries have encouraged immigrants
to continue to define themselves in terms of their ethnic or national origin.
They have also made it possible for the home countries of these immigrants
to become actively involved in the educational and religious activities
of the diaspora. Members of these diasporas who have experienced significant
upward social mobility possess educational, occupational, and financial
resources that enable them to make important contributions to national
causes involving their homelands. The democratic nature of the political
systems of these host countries means that they are very sensitive to lobbying
efforts conducted by diaspora communities on behalf of their homelands.
Well-organized and politically mobilized diaspora communities can, therefore,
play an important part in a triadic set of relationships involving diaspora
communities themselves, their host countries, and their countries of origin
The conflict between Greeks and Macedonians over which group
has the right to identify itself as Macedonians is an excellent example
of what Featherstone (1990:10) has called a "global cultural war" involving
two transnational national communities, each composed of a Balkan nation-state
and diaspora communities in multicultural societies like the United States,
Canada, and Australia. The Greek transnational national community is described
by Greek politicians with references to "Greece of the Five Continents"
and descriptions of Greeks in the diaspora as "the most powerful weapon"
in the arsenal of "World Hellenism." This notion of "World Hellenism" as
a reified nationality" which transcends the territorial boundaries of the
Greek state was expressed vividly in a lecture given by a Greek economist
teaching at a Canadian University during an international conference on
Greeks in the English-speaking diaspora held in Melbourne in 1992. He compared
"the Great Greece of World Hellenism" to a beautiful butterfly whose body
was Greece and whose wings, "its most precious asset which keeps it alive
and aloft," were the diaspora (Triantis 1992).
The Macedonian transnational national community, like its Greek
counterpart, consists of a variety of institutions linking the Republic
of Macedonia with Macedonians of the diaspora. Among the most important
of these is the Center for Macedonians Abroad, whose official name - The
Queen Bee of Emigrants from Macedonia - clearly conveys the image of the
national homeland as a powerful mother who keeps her diaspora children
working busily to promote her interests. In the early 1990s, when the Republic
of Macedonia was struggling to gain international recognition, several
transnational organizations were established in order to assist in this
effort. They include the World Macedonian Congress, the International Macedonian
Lobby, and the Macedonian Information and Liaison Service in Brussels,
a daily news service which provides world-wide distribution by fax and
electronic mail of political and economic developments in Macedonia. From
its inception the movement for the human rights of the Macedonian minority
in northern Greece has also had an important transnational dimension.
In addition to focusing on the growth of transnational national
communities, contemporary studies of ethnic nationalism must also take
into account the increasingly important role played in world affairs by
international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Community,
the World Bank, and the Nonaligned Movement. Each of these organizations
constitutes an international forum in which national conflicts can be raised,
monitored, and arbitrated. It is to these organizations that nations and
states must now turn when they seek recognition, legitimacy, or support.
The culture which pervades organizations like the United Nations
and the European Community is the culture of international business, law,
and diplomacy. This "third culture" (Unseem et al. 1963), in which transnational
communication at virtually all official levels takes place, has as its
central values universalist concepts, ultimately European in origin, of
individual equality, personal freedom, and human rights.9 It is ironic
that organizations espousing these values, which are so fundamentally at
odds with the values of nationalism, were originally established by nation-states
and have come to exert a great deal of control over both the external and
internal affairs of these states. In the global world of the late twentieth
century, then, national conflicts are being fought paradoxically on a transnational
level. Relationships between nation-states and ethnic minorities within
their boundaries are no longer the private, internal affairs of state they
once were. Now they frequently often involve diaspora communities of both
the dominant national group and the ethnic minority, their host countries,
as well as various international organizations.
The net effect of all these developments on issues of ethnic
nationalism is often quite dramatic. Ethnic minorities struggling for recognition
and human rights from the nation-states they inhabit attempt to mobilize
the support of diaspora communities abroad, which in turn attempt to enlist
the help of their host countries. Ethnic minorities also seek to shift
the balance of power in their favor and away from the nation-states they
are struggling against by appealing to international organizations. The
commitment of these organizations to human rights and cultural pluralism
often makes them much more responsive to the concerns of ethnic minorities
than national governments with their commitment to nationalist ideologies
of purity and homogeneity. 
5. Macedonian Human Rights and the Conference on Security and Cooperation
According to the 1990 Country Report on Human Rights Practices published
by the United States Department of State (1991:1172) there are between
20,000 and 50,000 Slavic-speakers in northern Greece, most of whom live
in the relatively underdeveloped area along the Greek-Yugoslavia border.
While the vast majority of these people have a Greek national identity,
a significant number of them (perhaps 5,000-10,000) have a Macedonian national
identity; that is, they identify themselves as Macedonians, not as Greeks.
Since the mid 1980s a small number of Macedonians (many of whose families
were severely persecuted at the time of the Greek Civil War) have become
politically active and begun to demand human rights for the Macedonian
minority in Greece.
In 1984 a Committee for Macedonian Human Rights was established
in northern Greece. In the next few years similar organizations were formed
by Aegean Macedonians in diaspora communities in Canada and Australia.
Among the goals of these groups are the repeal of several specific laws
which discriminate against Macedonians. One law (passed in 1982) denies
the right of all political refugees who left Greece after the Civil War
to return to Greece unless they are "Greek by birth." Another law (passed
in 1983) ceases to recognize university degrees obtained in the Republic
of Macedonia on the grounds that Macedonian is not an internationally recognized
More generally these Macedonian human rights groups seek the
recognition by the Greek government of the existence of a Macedonian minority
in Greece. They are working to end discrimination against Macedonians in
Greece in the fields of education and employment, as well as in other areas
of cultural, social, and political life. They want Macedonians in Greece
to have the right to attend church services in Macedonian, to receive their
primary and secondary education in Macedonian, and to publish newspapers
and broadcast radio and television programs in Macedonian. They also want
the right to establish Macedonian cultural organizations, such as the Center
for Macedonian Culture, which was formed in Florina in 1984, but which
in three separate court decisions has been refused legal recognition on
the grounds that it is a separatist organization and poses a threat to
national security. Finally, these groups have protested police interference
with village festivals where Macedonian folk songs and dances are performed,
as well as the harassment and persecution of Macedonian human rights activists,
some of whom have been denied entry into Greece, deprived of their Greek
citizenship, dismissed from their jobs, and even tried and sentenced to
prison for asserting their Macedonian identity. 
Since the publication
of their initial manifesto in 1984, Macedonian activists in northern Greece
have worked closely with leaders of Aegean Macedonian diaspora communities
in Canada and Australia. On several occasions human rights activists from
the region of Florina in northern Greece have traveled to Toronto, Perth,
and Melbourne in order to raise money for their cause and to foster cooperation
between Macedonians in the diaspora and those in the homeland. This transnational
Macedonian human rights network was well developed by 1988, when a variety
of protests and demonstrations on behalf of the human rights of Macedonians
in northern Greece took place in cities throughout the world.
of 1988 the Federation of Macedonian Associations of Victoria organized
a demonstration to protest the First International Congress of Macedonian
Studies, a conference organized by Greek and Greek-Australian academics
whose goal was to demonstrate "the Greekness of Macedonia" from antiquity
to the present (Danforth 1990). In June and July of that year, the First
International Reunion of Child Refuges of Aegean Macedonian was held in
Skopje, at which a resolution was adopted urging the Greek government to
allow Macedonian political refugees who left Greece after the Greek Civil
War to return to Greece. On August 10, 1988, the 75th anniversary of the
Treaty of Bucharest (the treaty that partitioned the Ottoman administrative
region of Macedonia among Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece), the Macedonian
National Committee of Toronto staged a demonstration at the headquarters
of the United Nations in New York calling on Greece and Bulgaria to respect
the human rights of their Macedonian minorities.
Then, in May
1989, an international Macedonian delegation, consisting of representatives
from northern Greece, Canada, and Australia, visited the Center for Human
Rights of the United Nations in Geneva as well as the Council of Europe
and the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The delegation had several objectives.
They wanted to draw the attention of European officials to the situation
of the Macedonian minorities in Greece and to lobby for political action
which would lead to a change in current Greek policies. They also wanted
to gather information about the various political and legal options available
to them for the advancement of the human rights of the Macedonian minorities
in Greece and Bulgaria. One of the most important outcomes of these meetings
was the realization that the best course of action open to them was to
file a complaint with the European Commission on Human Rights alleging
that by its treatment of its Macedonian minority Greece was in violation
the Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe.
in November, 1989, the Yugoslav representative to the United Nations accused
Greece of oppressing the human rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece.
This was the first time the Macedonian Question had been raised by the
Yugoslav government since the period following the Greek Civil War, a clear
indication that the tight grip which federal authorities under Tito had
kept on the nationalist tendencies of Yugoslavia's constituent nations
had begun to relax. Two other incidents offer further evidence that during
this period the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was beginning to enjoy
increasing freedom from the Yugoslav federal government to adopt more nationalist
positions. In February, 1990, a large demonstration took place in Skopje
to protest the violation of the human rights of the Macedonian minorities
in Bulgaria and Greece. Then in May, 1990, 50,000 Macedonians blocked the
border crossings between Yugoslavia and Greece in an effort to convince
the Greek government to recognize its Macedonian minority and to persuade
the Yugoslav government to pressure the Greek government to move in this
direction as well.
The most impressive
accomplishment of the transnational Macedonian human rights movement, however,
has been to organize delegations to attend several meetings of the Conference
on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, which took place in the early 1990s. The Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the "Helsinki process,"
is an on-going international political movement dedicated to promoting
the causes of peace, human rights, and social and economic cooperation.
The CSCE originally involved all the countries of Europe except Albania,
as well as the former Soviet Union, Canada, and the United States. In 1975
the leaders of the 35 participating states met in Helsinki, Finland and
signed what have come to be known as the Helsinki Accords, a document containing
a declaration of principles governing relations between states; these include
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the self-determination
of peoples, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the inviolability
of frontiers. They also include provisions concerning economic, scientific,
and environmental cooperation, as well as provisions regarding cultural
cooperation, educational exchanges, and the free flow of information.
of the Helsinki Accords initiated a series of follow-up meetings to review
implementation of the Helsinki provisions and if necessary to enhance them
as well. The Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE, which
was signed in 1989, significantly strengthened the human rights provisions
of the Helsinki Accords. It alluded specifically to the rights of minorities
and to the right of citizens to monitor the human rights performance of
the governments of their own countries. It also established a continuous
process of human rights review through an agreement to hold three yearly
meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE.
The second meeting
of the Conference on the Human Dimension was held in Copenhagen in June
of 1990. It was attended by an international Macedonian delegation which
consisted of fifteen members from eight countries. The "internal" delegates
included one from Bulgarian or Pirin Macedonia, two from Greek or Aegean
Macedonia, and four from the Republic of Macedonia. The "external" delegates
included two from Australia, three from Canada, and one each from Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and West Germany.  The majority of
the delegates were there as representatives of local Macedonian Human.
Rights Committees or local branches of the Association of Child Refugees
from Aegean Macedonia. The leaders of the delegation were particularly
pleased that they had been able to assemble for the first time "a united
Macedonian delegation on a world scale."
delegation participated in the Copenhagen conference as an officially recognized
non-governmental organization (NGO), as did such groups as the Albanians
of Kosovo, the Hungarians of Rumania, the Armenians, and the Kurds. In
that capacity it attended both the official meetings and the parallel NGO
activities, which included a variety of seminars and workshops on human
rights issues. The two major goals of the Macedonian delegation were to
persuade as many of the Official state delegations as they could to address
the situation of the Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece in the
Final Document of the meeting and to raise the issue of Macedonian human
rights directly with the governments of Bulgaria and Greece.
Early in the
conference Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands
introduced a proposal on national minorities, a topic which was clearly
going to be one of the central issues of the conference. In his introduction
to the proposal a Canadian delegate pointed out that since no one could
ever draw "a perfect map of Europe," national minorities would always exist.
He called on all governments to demonstrate tolerance, respect, and understanding
toward these minorities. After noting that Canada and many other participating
state have interpreted the term "national minority" as used in the Helsinki
Accords to include "ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious minorities,"
he condemned the practice by which some states attempted to evade their
CSCE commitments regarding national minorities by claiming that no national
minorities existed within their borders. After outlining Canada's multicultural
policies and describing the cultural mosaic that constitutes Canadian society,
he concluded by stressing the value of promoting the ethnic, cultural,
linguistic, and religious identity of all minority groups.
A very different
tone was conveyed by the head of the Greek delegation in his presentation
to the conference several days later. After emphasizing that the issue
of minorities was not only one of human rights, but above all an important
social problem with major political consequences, he urged member states
not to "attempt to further codify the rights of persons belonging to minorities,"
but instead to convene a meeting of experts to further study the concept
of minorities in order to arrive at a common understanding of the complexities
of the issue.
On June 21,
the Yugoslav delegation to the conference introduced a "Memorandum relating
to the Macedonian national minority" which accused the governments of Bulgaria
and Greece of a number of specific violations of the human rights of the
members of the Macedonian national minorities living in their countries.
It also charged the two countries with failing to fulfill their commitments
to this minority under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE. The Yugoslav
memorandum closed by calling on the governments of Bulgaria and Greece
to submit reports on the steps they have taken to protect the rights of
the Macedonian minorities in their countries at the next meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE to be held in Moscow the
A few days later
the head of the Greek delegation issued a sharp reply to the Yugoslav memorandum
in which he accused the Yugoslav delegation of undermining CSCE efforts
to safeguard minority rights by manipulating the issue in the service of
extremist, adventurist, and irredentist policies. He drew attention to
the "negative record of human and minority rights violations in Yugoslav
Macedonia" and referred specifically to the mistreatment of the Albanian
and Serbian minorities in the Republic of Macedonia. He then defended the
human rights record of Greece and pointed out that as "a member of the
democratic family of the European Community," Greece has ratified a variety
of international human rights instruments. Finally, he stated that the
Macedonian problem was a non-issue and simply denied that a Macedonian
national minority existed in Greece. Any assertion to the contrary, he
insisted, was an attempt to usurp the name and identity of two and a half
million Greek-Macedonians and therefore constituted a gross violation of
their human rights.
of the official Greek delegation was supported by an open letter sent to
conference participants by the Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario, a
Greek-Macedonian organization, several of whose members were present at
the Copenhagen meeting. They accused "Slav-Macedonian emigres" under the
direction of the authorities in Skopje of trying to detach Greek Macedonia
from the Greek state under the pretext of human rights -- of using, in
other words, a "human rights approach" to advance territorial claims against
Greek Macedonia. In their meetings with other delegations, the representatives
of the Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario insisted that the only Macedonians,
the "real" Macedonians, were Greeks.
To further complicate
the situation, representatives of the Association of Macedonian Societies
in Bulgaria who were attending the Copenhagen meeting filed a memorandum
in which they argued that the Macedonian nation was an artificial creation
of Serbia and that all the Slavs of Macedonia were actually Bulgarians.
After documenting the persecution of inhabitants of Yugoslav Macedonia
who had a Bulgarian national identity, this memorandum criticized statements
asserting the existence of a "Macedonian Nation" as part of a campaign
to conquer all of Macedonia being carried out by "Great Serbian Jingoists."
The memorandum concluded with an urgent call for the recognition of the
human rights of the Bulgarian minorities of Yugoslavia and Greece. Needless
to say, some of the representatives of the 35 participating CSCE states
were confused by their encounters with three different groups of people
each of which identified itself as a Macedonian delegation but each of
which offered a different definition of who the Macedonians really were.
At one point
during the conference, a member of the official Greek delegation attempted
to prevent the Macedonian delegation from distributing its literature at
the information stand which had been set up at the entrance to the main
conference center in order to publicize the activities of the various non-governmental
organizations. An attendant at the information stand saw the Deputy Head
of the Greek delegation remove large quantities of the Macedonian delegation's
literature. When she notified her supervisor, he asked the Greek delegate
to stop. The next day the Head of the Greek delegation officially requested
that the conference Secretariat remove the information stand of the non-governmental
organizations. When this request was denied, the Greek delegation called
for the suspension of the Macedonian delegation's right to use the stand.
This request, however, was also denied.
later the Macedonian delegation held a press conference, which was sponsored
by the Yugoslav delegation. In addition to presenting
their case more generally, the Macedonian delegates attempted to publicize
this particular incident as widely as possible. Danish newspapers published
articles under headlines that read "Attempt to censure the Macedonians"
and "Literature of a minority removed." As members of the Macedonian delegation
later reported, many conference participants were left wondering "if attempts
to deny Macedonians basic rights are made at an international conference
on human rights, then what must the situation be like for them in Greece
The Final Document
of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, which was adopted by consensus, is a general reaffirmation of the
commitment of the participating states to democracy, political pluralism,
the rule of law, and human rights, which was expressed in both the Helsinki
Accords and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE.
The section of the document dealing with the issue of national minorities
affirms that "persons belonging to national minorities have the right to
exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms
without any discrimination and in full equality before the law." In an
attempt to define the term "national minority," the document states that
belonging to a national minority "is a matter of a person's individual
choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice."
More specifically it declares that
includes the right of national minorities to establish their own cultural
associations and to conduct religious and educational activities in their
Persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely
to express, preserve, and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or
religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its
aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will.
rights activists - farmers and civil servants from northern Greece, as
well as lawyers, business men, manual laborers, and students from Canada
and Australia - state unequivocally that they reject the irredentist concept
of "a Greater Macedonia" and that they do not want to change the present
international borders in the Balkans. The Europeans
are tearing down walls and opening borders, they say. Why would they want
to build new ones? That would mean war, and no one wants war. As a model
for the future, a model for change, they look not to the violent process
of disintegration taking place in Yugoslavia, but to its antithesis, the
peaceful process of integration taking place simultaneously in Europe.
In describing their political goals they appeal to the concept of a united
Europe, a Europe without borders. In such a world borders would be meaningless,
travel and communication would be unrestricted, and Macedonians, wherever
they lived, would be united and free.
human rights activists, in other words, are looking forward idealistically
to the end of the nation-state and to the rise of pluralistic transnational
communities such as "the new Europe." Until that rather distant goal is
realized, however, they are attempting to gain human rights for the Macedonian
minorities in Bulgaria and Greece by constructing their own transnational
community, a community epitomized by the "international Macedonian delegation"
to the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE. Drawing on the personal experiences of discrimination of the "internal"
delegates from Bulgaria and Greece as well as the professional expertise
of the "external" delegates - judges and lawyers raised in the multicultural
societies of Canada and Australia - this delegation effectively exposed
the failure of the Greek state with its commitment to a nationalist ideology
of ethnic homogeneity and purity to treat its Macedonian minority in a
manner consistent with its obligations to the international human rights
accords it has signed. In doing so the Macedonian delegation took full
advantage of the forum provided by the CSCE, a transnational organization
committed to pluralism and the protection of the rights of national minorities
defined on the basis of the principle of self-identification. In this way,
then, national minorities like the Macedonians are gradually beginning
to shift the balance of power in their favor and away from nation-states
like Bulgaria and Greece which they are struggling against.
rights activists are motivated by a desire to protect the human rights
of the Macedonian national minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. They want
to preserve, or more accurately perhaps, to create a Macedonian national
identity among people who have been for almost a century the targets of
Bulgarian or Greek assimilationist policies. The nationalism of Macedonian
human rights activists is muted, for strictly speaking it is inconsistent
with the human rights discourse to which they are committed. But it is
nationalism nonetheless, a counter-nationalism, which developed at least
partially in reaction to the nationalist policies of Bulgaria and Greece.
And in its more extreme forms Macedonian nationalism is characterized by
the same narrowness and intolerance as the Bulgarian and Greek nationalisms
which Macedonians have struggled against for so long.
It is one of the fundamental ironies of the Macedonian human rights movement,
therefore, that coexisting in uneasy tension with an explicit commitment
to pluralism and respect for the principle of self-identification lies
an implicit commitment to a diametrically opposed ideology - the ideology
of Macedonian nationalism. Macedonian human rights activists, who have
suffered the negative consequences of the nationalist ideologies of Bulgaria
and Greece, are also, to a degree at least, Macedonian nationalists. The
international Macedonian delegation to Copenhagen was still in the final
analysis a national delegation, just as the Macedonian transnational community
is still a national community.
This essay is part of a forthcoming book tentatively entitled The Macedonian
Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World to be published by
Princeton University Press. The research on which this project is based
includes short periods of fieldwork carried out in the region of Florina
in northern Greece in 1990 and in Toronto, Canada in 1991, both supported
by a Roger C. Schmutz Faculty Research Grant from Bates College. It also
includes an extended period of fieldwork conducted in Melbourne, Australia,
in 1991-92, supported by a Fulbright Scholar Award. Thanks to a grant from
the National Endowment for the Humanities I was able to devote the 1992-93
academic year to this project as well. My work on the Macedonian Question
has benefited from the advice and the moral support of several fine colleagues:
Victor Friedman, Roger Just, Michael Herzfeld, Anastasia Karakasidou, and
Riki van Boeschoten. I take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude
to them all.
1. In this essay, as in general
political, scholarly, and journalistic discourse, the term Macedonian is
used in a national sense to refer to people with a Macedonian national
identity. According to this usage, "Macedonian" and "Greek" are mutually
exclusive categories referring to people with two different national identities.
"Macedonian" is also used in a regional sense to refer to people with a
Greek national identity who come from Macedonia. These people often refer
to themselves as "Greek-Macedonians."
2. For detailed accounts of
the events of this period see Perry (1988) Dakin and (1966).
3. For a Greek perspective
on the history of the Macedonian Question see Kofos
(1964 and 1989) and Martis (1983); for a Macedonian perspective see
(1976) and articles published in the Macedonian Review. For other perspectives
see Danforth (1993), Friedman (1975), Jelavich (1983), Lunt (1984),
King (1971), and Wilkinson (195i).
4. The general consensus among
ancient historians is that in their own time the ancient Macedonians were
perceived by the Greeks and by themselves not to be Greek. See Badian (1982),
Borza (1990:96), and Hammond (1986:535). On continuity in Greek culture
see Herzfeld (1982 and 1987). On the construction of Greek national identity
see Kitromilides (1989).
5. It must be noted that the
construction of a distinct Macedonian national identity is a relatively
recent phenomenon even by Balkan standards. Its origins can be traced to
the work of a small group of late nineteenth- and early twentieth -century
intellectuals like Krste Misirkov, who in 1903 called for the "recognition
of the Slavs in Macedonia as a separate nationality - Macedonians" (Misirkov
1974:73). At this time, however, the majority of the Slavic-speaking inhabitants
of Macedonia were illiterate peasants with no clearly developed sense of
national identity see Friedman (1975).
6. For statements of this moderate
position see Karakasidou (1993:13-14), Popov and Radin (1989:73), the response
by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Macedonia to the Arbitration
Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia sponsored by the European
Community, and the comments of Macedonian human rights activists in northern
Greece published in the Greek periodical Ena March 11, 1992.
7. Important work on ethnic
nationalism includes Brass (1985), Connor (1973 and 1977), Guidieri et
al. (1988), and Smith (1981 and 1986).
8. Robertson (1987: 30). On
the concept of globalization see also Featherstone (1990a), and King (1991).
9. Texts in which these values
have been articulated include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and the European
Convention on Human Rights adopted by the European Community in 1950.
10. For further discussion
of these issues see Robertson (1987), Hall (1991), and Wallerstein (1991).
Gupta (1992) examines the way Third World nations attempted to strengthen
their position in the world system through the establishment of the Nonaligned
11. The Macedonian Movement
for Balkan Prosperity, an organization committed to protecting the human
rights of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece, participated in the
1994 elections for the European Parliament under the name "Rainbow" (a
European-wide movement representing the interests of a variety of linguistic
and cultural minorities). They received over 7,000 votes, the majority
of them from the regions of Florina, Kastoria, and Edhessa.
12. The term "Aegean Macedonians"
is used by Macedonians to refer to Macedonians from northern Greece. Greeks
object to the term on the grounds that it implies an unwillingness to recognize
Greek sovereignty over Greek Macedonia.
13. For further information
on the situation of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece see the
recent report by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki entitled Denying Ethnic Identity:
The Macedonians of Greece. See also Karakasidou (1993), Popov and Radin
(1989), Poulton (1991), and the entry on Greece in recent issues of the
United States Department of State's Countrv Reports on Human Rights Practices.
14. For a full account of
the activities of this delegation see Radin and Popov (nd).
15. The designation of Macedonians
from Greece and Bulgaria as "internal" delegates supports Esman's (1986:333)
argument that "ethnic groups whose minority status results not from migration,
but from conquest, annexation or arbitrary boundary arrangements" differ
significantly from diaspora groups and should be considered separately.
Esman's position preserves migration as an essential feature of the diaspora
experience and avoids equating a national homeland (the entire geographical
region of Macedonia) with the state in which a nation is the dominant group
(the Republic of Macedonia itself).
16. According to conference
rules, in order to hold a press conference, non--governmental organizations
were required to obtain the sponsorship of an official governmental delegation.
17. The full text of the Final
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension
of the CSCE was published by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe in June, 1990.
18. The most complete statement
of the goals of the Macedonian human rights movement is contained in Popov
and Radin (1989).
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983.
Appadurai, Arjun. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural
Economy." Public Culture 2 (1990):1-24.
Badian, E. Greeks and Macedonians. In "Macedonia and Greece in Late
Classical and Early Hellenistic Times." Studies in the History of Art.
Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art. 10 (1982):33-51.
Borza, Eugene N. In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Brass, Paul, ed. Ethnic Groups and the State. London: Croom Helm, 1985.
Connor, Walker. "The Politics of Ethnonationalism." Journal of International
Affairs 27 (1973):1-21.
"Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Perspective."
Ethnic Pluralism and Conflict in the Western World. Ed. Milton Esman. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell UP, 1977.
Dakin, Douglas. The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913. Thessaloniki:
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966.
Danforth, Loring M. "The Denial of Macedonian Identity at the First
International Congress on Macedonian Studies." Paper presented at the 89th
Meeting of the American Ethnological Association. New Orleans, LA, 1990.
"Claims to Macedonian Identity: The Macedonian Question and the Break-up
of Yugoslavia." Anthropology Today 9 (1993):3-10.
Esman, Milton J. "Diasporas and International Relations." Modern Diasporas
in International Politics. Ed. Gabriel Sheffer. NY: St. Martins Press.
Featherstone, Mike, ed. Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization,
and Modernity. London: Sage. 1990a; "Global Culture: An Introduction."
In Featherstone, ed. Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity.
Ed. Mike Featherstone. London:Sage. 1990b. 1-14.
Friedman, Victor. "Macedonian Language and Nationalism During the Nineteenth
and Early Twentieth Centuries." Balkanistica II (1975):83-98.
Guidieri, Remo et al. Ethnicities and Nations. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1988.
Gupta, Akhil. "The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities
and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism." Cultural Anthropology
Hall, Stuart. "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity."
Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for
the Representation of Identity. Ed. Stuart Hall. Binghamton, NY: Dept.
of Art History, SUNY at Binghamton. 1991. 19-39.
Hammond, N. G. L. A History of Greece to 332 B.C. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon
Herzfeld, Michael. Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making
of Modern Greece. Austin: U of Texas P, 1982.
Anthropology Through the Looking Glass: Critical Ethnography on the
Margins of Europe. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1987.
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians
of Greece. New York, 1994.
Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans. 2 Vols. Cambridge: At the
University Press, 1983.
Karakasidou, Anastasia. "Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity
in Greek Macedonia." Journal of Modern Greek Studies 11 (1993):1-28.
King, Anthony D., ed. Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary
Conditions for the Representation of Identity. Binghamton, NY: Dept. of
Art History, SUNY at Binghamton, 1991.
Kitromilides, Pashalis. "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the
National Question in the Balkans." European History Quarterly 19 (1989):149-94.
Kofos, Evangelos. Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia. Thessaloniki:
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964; "National Heritage and National
Identity in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Macedonia." European History
Quarterly 19 (1989):229-267.
Lunt, Horace. "Some Sociolinguistic Aspects of Macedonian and Bulgarian."
In Language and Literary Theory. Eds. Benjamin Stoltz, I.R. Titunik, and
Lubomir Dolezel. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1984. 83-132.
Martis, Nicolaos K The Falsification of Macedonian History. Athens:
"Graphic Arts" of Athanassiades Bros., 1983.
Misirkov, Krste. On Macedonian Matters. Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions,
Palmer, Stephen E. Jr. and Robert R. King. Yugoslav Communism and the
Macedonian Question. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971.
Perry, Duncan. The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Revolutionary
Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1988.
Popov, Chris and Michael Radin. Contemporary Greek Government Policy
on the Macedonian Issue and Discriminatory Practices in Breach of International
Law. Melbourne: Central Organizational Committee for Macedonian Human
Rights, Australian Sub-Committee, 1989.
Poulton, Hugh. The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict. London:
Minority Rights Publications, 1991.
Pribichevich, Stoyan. Macedonia: Its People and History. University
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1982.
Radin, Michael and Chris Popov. The Way Ahead for Macedonian Human Rights.
Adelaide: The Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee, nd.
Robertson, Roland. "Globalization Theory and Civilization Analysis."
Comparative Civilizations Review, 17 (1987):220-30.
Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: At the University Press,
1981; The Ethnic Origin of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Tashkovski, Dragan. The Macedonian Nation. Skopje: Nasha Kniga, 1976.
Triantis, Stephen G. "Greeks and World Hellenism. Paper presented at
a conference on Greeks in English Speaking Countries. March, 1992. Melbourne,
United States Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1990. Washington, DC, 1991.
Unseem, John, et al. "Men in the Middle of the Third Culture." Human
Organization 22 (1963):169-179.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The National and the Universal: Can There be
Such a Thing as World Culture?" Culture, Globalization and the World-System:
Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity. Ed. Anthony
D. King. Binghamton, NY: Dept.of Art History, SUNY at Binghamton. 1991.
Wilkinson, Henry R. Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic
Cartography of Macedonia. Liverpool: At the University Press, 1951.
Copyright Loring M. Danforth